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Further Reforms after the “BIG BANG”: 






This paper identifies key steps for further development of the JGB market in 
aligning its infrastructures with those of the U.S. and U.K. government securities 
markets.   One major impediment to the JGB market development is commingled 
management of government assets and liabilities.  Especially Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Program’s inadvertent influence over monetary policy not only causes the cost 
of government-issued debt to increase but also creates serious impediments to the 
development of the JGB markets.  Therefore, it is recommended that Ministry of 
Finance’s involvement in the JGB market should be limited to issuer’s function in the 
capacity of government debt manager and a “hands-off” policy be adopted by the 
Ministry of Finance to give all FILP agencies complete autonomy.  Additional reform 
measures are recommended to create a more efficient and effective JGB market: (i) 
promote JGBs with non-resident investors; (ii) introduce the primary dealer system; 
(iii) adopt the uniform-price auction method; (iv) allow when-issued trading; (v) 
develop a truly American-style REPO market; and (vi) introduce STRIPS.   
 
 
   3 
 
Further Reforms after the “BIG BANG”: 
The Japanese Government Bond Market   
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
At the end of 1999, Japanese government bonds (JGBs) issued by the 
central government reached ¥359 trillion (US$3.30 trillion), exceeding the United 
States in outstanding Treasury securities balance of $3.28 trillion.  In fiscal year 
2000 alone, Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) plans to raise a gross amount of 
¥85.87 trillion through the issuance of JGBs, while the U.S. Treasury paid down 
$140 billion in debt over last two years and plans to do so further.  As a result, Japan 
is expected to remain the largest issuer of government debt in the world in the 
foreseeable future.  As summarized in Table 1, Japan’s government debt is 
expected to reach 137% of GDP in year 2000, whereas the United States and 
United Kingdom are expected to achieve debt levels of 53% and 61% relative to 
their respective GDPs.  
[Insert Table 1] 
This is bad news for Japan’s economy and future credit rating of JGBs.  Even 
though it sounds far-fetched at present to discuss the risk of runaway inflation given 
the deflationary trend of the Japanese economy, the latent threat of inflation cannot 
be overlooked in the presence of ever-increasing fiscal deficits in the Japanese 
government budget.  According to the International Monetary Fund’s prediction, 
Japan’s fiscal deficit will reach 7.1% of its GDP in year 2000, while the United States 
will gain a surplus of 2% as presented in Panel B of Table 1.  Furthermore,   4 
international credit rating agencies such as Moody’s and Duff and Phelps issue 
warnings about possible down-grading of yen-denominated debt rating.   
The fact that Japan will remain the largest issuer of government debt 
securities is important news for further development of the JGB market because the 
MOF will be forced to heed the cost minimization of JGBs.
1  Any reform measures 
necessary to attain this goal will be adopted more expediently and decisively than 
ever before.   
This paper reviews key steps for further development of the JGB market in 
aligning its infrastructures with those of the U.S. and U.K. government securities 
markets.  The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections.  In Section II, we 
assess if Japan’s MOF is able to minimize the cost of JGBs given the current status 
of the market.  In Section III, we identify numerous reform measures to create a 
more effective and efficient JGB market.  The last section touches upon particularly 
urgent policy issues on the regional level for the progression of the JGB market to 
better serve global and regional constituencies.    
II.  How to Minimize the Cost of Government Debt Securities?  
Schinasi and Smith (1998) recommend three courses of action to minimize 
the cost of government debt securities: first, tap the pool of global capital; second, 
grant greater independence to government debt management from monetary policy; 
and, third, reform primary and secondary market infrastructures to appeal to 
institutional investors.  When the cost minimizing effort is assessed against the 
above three criteria, Japan’s MOF does not earn a good mark.   
                                            
1 The ratio of government bond issues to total government expenditures in the fiscal year 2000 budget 
will be 38.4%.  Refer to a Fiscal Policy Speech by Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa at the 147
th 
Session of the National Diet in January 2000.   5 
A.  Tapping the Pool of Global Capital   
Inonue (1999) reports that non-residents hold approximately 10% of JGBs, 
while non-resident holdings of U.S. and U.K. government debt amount to 36.9% and 
14.4%, respectively.  Schinasi and Smith (1998), however, report a smaller 
percentage in the order of 4%-5% for Japan, citing the Bank for International 
Settlements source.  This suggests that further internationalization of the yen is 
necessary to tap the pool of global capital.  Although some concerns have been 
expressed regarding the delay of implementing reform measures in the areas of 
pension system, bank re-capitalization, and deposit insurance scheme, the MOF 
should be credited for its Big Bang reforms in internationalizing the yen.  As of April 
1999, the withholding tax on redemption gains and interest income from JGBs were 
exempted for non-residents and foreign corporations.
2  The impact of eliminating 
withholding taxes in Japan has yet to be assessed, but it is expected to have a 
significant and lasting effect on non-resident holding of JGBs.
3      
B.  Granting Greater Independence to Government Debt Management Program 
from Monetary Policy 
 
As far as the management of government assets and liabilities is concerned, 
central banks are responsible for assets management while ministries of finance 
maintain operational authority over liabilities management.  As Cassard and 
                                            
2 Campbell (1997) forcefully illustrates how the counter-party risk was unnecessarily created by the 
lack of ownership registration to avoid the withholding taxes and how unnecessary “churning” prior to 
coupon payment dates added costly transaction costs as non-resident investors switch out of their 
JGB holdings before the Big Bang financial reforms were implemented. 
 
3 Germany eliminated withholding taxes on interest income from domestic government bonds held by 
non-residents in October 1984.  As a result, the percentage of German government bonds held by  
foreign investors jumped from 10% in 1984 to 38% in 1988.   This information is drawn from the 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi Securities Company’s web site.   
   6 
Folkerts-Landau (1997) espouse, such separation of responsibilities is necessary 
considering the potential conflicts of interest between monetary policy and debt 
management.  In Japan, however, MOF violates the simple rule of separating assets 
and liabilities management because of the activities of its Trust Fund Bureau (TFB).  
The TFB is the largest fund manager in the world, managing a total asset of ¥440 
trillion, which is known as the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP).
4  As 
presented in Table 2, the primary sources of the FILP fund are comprised of postal 
savings (58%) and employee’s and national pension deposits (32%).  On the asset 
side of the balance sheet, the fund is invested in government-owned organizations 
(27%), general and special accounts (23%), JGBs (19%), municipal governments 
(15%), etc.   
[Insert Table 2] 
Although MOF considers FILP an extension of its fiscal policy, its purchase 
activities of JGBs are perceived critically important by market participants in 
predicting the direction of long-term interest rate movement.  For example, the TFB 
announced in the latter part of 1999 that it would suspend ¥200 billion ($1.91 billion) 
bond purchases in the open market each month.  This announcement triggered the 
prices of JGBs to decline sharply, raising their yields to as high as 2.7%.   After the 
resumption of the purchase activities by TFB, however, the yield level stabilized to 
the current level of around 1.8% (10-year JGBs).
5  With FILP’s holdings accounting 
for over one-third of JGBs outstanding, the MOF is effectively the largest seller and 
                                            
4 This amount is equivalent to approximately 80% of Japan’s GDP. 
 
5 Refer to “Bond Plan Key to Halting Rise in Japan Interest” Asian Wall Street Journal (November 30, 
1999).      7 
buyer of JGBs.  This dual role executed by MOF is an explicit violation of the rule of 
separation between government debt management and monetary policy.   
Commingled management of assets and liabilities, especially FILP’s inadvertent 
influence over monetary policy, not only causes the cost of government-issued debt 
to increase but also creates serious impediments to the development of the JGB 
markets as discussed below.   
C.  Unfinished Primary and Secondary Markets Infrastructures   
Recognizing the growing importance of capital-market-based financing, the 
Big Bang program implemented numerous reform measures to improve the primary 
and secondary markets infrastructure since November 1996.  These measures 
include: (i) deregulation of cross-border transactions and foreign exchange 
business; (ii) adoption of a competitive auction method to issue financing bills;
6 (iii) 
abolition of securities transaction tax; (iv) deregulation of brokerage commissions; 
(v) preparation of legal framework for loan/asset securitization; (vi) deregulation of 
off-exchange trading; (vii) entry by banks, securities companies, and insurance 
companies into each other’s business; (viii) introduction of individual stock options; 
and (ix) replacement of merit-based licensing system with a disclosure-based 
registration system for securities companies.  As summarized in Table 3, the scope 
and complexity of the reform programs were unprecedented.  The coordinated effort 
among various government agencies was exemplary in implementing these Big 
Bang reform measures. 
                                            
6  Financing bills are issued on a discount basis like Treasury bills.  Because the discount rate 
remained below prevailing short-term market interest rate, virtually all issues had to be subscribed by 
the Bank of Japan (BOJ).  Under the Big Bang reform programs, Treasury financing bills, food 
financing bills, and foreign exchange fund bills are all integrated into single financing bills and they are 
issued under a competitive auction system.     8 
[Insert Table 3] 
With the aim of identifying the unfinished reform areas for the JGB market, 
however, Japan may want to consider the U.S. government securities market as a 
role model.  In retrospect, four major developments signify the underlying forces that 
rapidly expanded the U.S. government securities markets in the 1980s.  These 
developments are: (i) active trading of Treasury securities on a when-issued basis 
which assisted in minimizing the underwriting risk by reducing price and quantity 
uncertainties; (ii) introduction of financial futures and options written on Treasury 
securities which provided necessary vehicles for hedging of interest rate risk; (iii) 
expansion of REPO and reverse REPO transactions which supported the increase 
of market liquidity and short-term investment activities; and (iv) introduction of the 
Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (STRIPS) which 
facilitated hedging of reinvestment risk through coupon stripping.   
Presently, when-issued trading is illegal in Japan.  STRIPS has yet to be 
introduced.  Although localized variations of REPO markets such as the Gensaki 
market and the Kashisai market emerged in Japan, their developments were 
inhibited by tax-related impediments (Gensaki market) and interest rate ceiling on 
the cash collateral (Kashisai market).  For example, as Gensaki is recognized as a 
form of bond trading, REPO transactions on the Gensaki market were subject to 
securities transaction tax.  Therefore, the majority of Gensaki  transactions were 
implemented using Treasury bills and financing bills that were exempted from 
securities transaction tax.  However, stamp duties on bills could not be avoided.  In 
contrast, transactions on the Kashisai market have not been subject to securities   9 
transaction taxes.  Legal and operational modalities of the two markets, however, 
reflected a hybrid form of American-style classic REPOs and European-style sale-
and-buyback contracts.  As a result, the two markets could not fully develop.  The 
Japanese futures market (with equity index and long-term bond as underlying 
assets) has earned an unfortunate reputation of an “over-regulated” market because 
of stringent regulatory policies including margin requirements and circuit breakers. 
III.  Post-Big Bang Reform Measures 
In terms of GDP, Japan’s economy is about one-half the size of U.S. 
economy while it is about four times as large as United Kingdom’s economy.  As 
Japan’s capital market development emulates past experiences of the U.S. 
counterpart, the above four areas should be an interesting point of departure in 
assessing further reforms for the JGB market.  Since the JGB market has matured 
in its own historical, macroeconomic, and institutional framework, it faces its own 
unique blend of capital market policy issues.  Therefore, this section will introduce 
some capital market policy issues that are unique to the JGB market as well as the 
policy issues in light of U.S. market experiences.   
A.  Lack of the Primary Dealer System  
One idiosyncratic feature of the JGB market is the lack of the primary dealer 
system.  This may be attributed in large part to the role played by TFB as a de facto 
underwriter in the primary market.  With TFB serving as an active buyer of newly 
issued JGBs (usually under a buy-and-hold investment strategy), purely competitive 
public auctions must have been difficult to implement.  Naturally, underwriting by a 
syndicate has been the standard in the JGB primary markets, especially for the   10 
benchmark 10-year bonds, with a specific goal of absorbing the full amount of new 
issues.  Although competitive auction features were built into the current syndicate 
underwriting, their utilization has been limited.  Public auction systems (based on the 
multiple-price auctions) were introduced later for the maturities of 2-, 4-, 6-, and 20-
year bonds, but syndicate underwriting and non-competitive auctions remain the 
major vehicle to absorb new issues of JGBs.  As a result, a primary dealer system 
providing competitive bidding at primary market auctions did not find its position in 
the JGB market.   
With respect to international investors’ primary concerns regarding low 
liquidity and large spread between bid and ask prices on the JGB market, the 
introduction of a primary dealer system is definitely a viable alternative that deserves 
serious consideration.
7  Primary dealer systems are designed to attain at least three 
goals in the government securities market: first, efficient price discovery through 
intense competition among participating dealers; second, provision of liquidity 
through market-making; and third, distribution of government-issued securities.  In 
addition, primary dealers serve as the counterparts to central banks in open market 
operations.  Most of the advanced economies adopted the primary dealer system 
with the exception of Japan and Germany, where both economies are historically 
known for their bank-based financial systems as opposed to the U.S. and U.K.-style 
capital-market-based financial system.   
[Insert Table 4] 
                                            
7 Refer to Table 4 “Government Securities Markets.” 
   11 
The major impediment to the adoption of the primary dealer system in Japan 
is MOF’s role as a buyer of JGBs.  Therefore, it is a blessing in disguise that the 
MOF expects a large shortfall in FILP funds amounting to approximately ¥35 trillion 
as fixed 10-year deposits in the national postal savings system mature in 2000 and 
2001.
8   This expected shortfall forces MOF to review structural reforms in the 
funding method and the management of FILP agencies with the implementation 
target in 2001.  Given the sheer magnitude and scope of FILP activities, the 
complexity of FILP reforms is beyond comprehension.
9   However, the overall 
direction of FILP reform is not difficult to define no matter how complicated the 
process is.  First, FILP agencies should be corporatized to gain complete autonomy, 
while MOF should adopt a “hands-off” policy.  This “hands-off” policy will facilitate 
the separation between management of government assets and liabilities.  Second, 
the MOF should not meddle with the JGB market as an active buyer.  The MOF’s 
direct involvement should be limited to issuer’s function in the capacity of the 
manager of government debt.   
B.  Introduction of the Uniform-Price Auction Method:   
In an MOF publication, entitled Guide to Japanese Government Bond 1998, 
the uniform-price auction method is introduced as a “non-competitive” bidding 
method executed at the average price paid in the competitive auction undertaken 
concurrently.  This is not a generic definition of the uniform-price auction but a 
Japan-specific interpretation.  Under the conventional uniform-price auction (also 
                                            
8 Refer to “Japanese turn to ‘zaito’ to boost finances” (Financial Times, March 13, 2000). 
 
9   Refer to an MOF web site, http://www.mof.go.jp/english/zaito/zae054a.htm, for “Fundamental 
Reform of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP).” 
   12 
known as the “Dutch” auction), all bidders whose tenders are accepted pay the 
same price for a given security.  This is either the lowest of the accepted prices or 
the highest of the accepted yields.  Therefore, some of the successful bidders may 
pay a lower price than they actually bid.  In contrast, under the multiple-price 
auctions (also known as the “discriminatory” auction), participants submit sealed 
bids and pay the prices they bid.  The government accepts the bids at gradually 
lower prices until the price at which the auction is fully subscribed.
10  As a result, 
successful bidders for a security may pay different prices for that security.  These 
multiple-price awards result in the “winner’s curse,” which means that the highest 
bidder wins the auction by paying the highest price, only to find that another bidder 
pays a lower price.  In the presence of this curse, bidders tend to shade their bids 
below the maximum that they are actually willing to pay.
11  Since Salomon’s “short 
squeeze” scandal uncovered in mid-1991, the multiple-price method has been 
criticized for failing to minimize financing costs to the U.S. Treasury and for 
encouraging manipulative behavior in the marketplace.  As an alternative, the 
“uniform-price, sealed-bid” auction is advocated.
12   
Australia, France, and New Zealand now utilize multiple-price (or multiple-
yield) auctions to sell marketable securities, while Canada, Belgium, Italy, and the 
                                            
10 In some countries, minimum cut-off prices are imposed by ministries of finance or fiscal agents 
conducting auctions, which may distort truly competitive bidding process because: (i) the bidders try to 
second-guess cut-off prices rather than assessing the demand and supply of the securities to be 
issued; or (ii) the cut-off prices may set the yields higher than market conditions warrant.  At the time 
of writing this report, it is not known to the author whether this practice is used in multiple-price 
auctions in Japan.  Refer to Rhee (2000b) for related practices in primary government bond markets 
in the Asia-Pacific region.   
  
11 For details, refer to the Joint Report on the Government Securities Market (1992) prepared by the 
Department of the Treasury, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
12 Refer to Friedman (1991 and 1960), Chari and Weber (1992), and Umlauf (1993).   13 
Netherlands use it for some portions of marketable securities.  Uniform-price, 
sealed-bid auctions are employed in Denmark, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom.  Beginning in 1992, the US Treasury experimented with uniform-price 
auctions for 2-year and 5-year notes.  Malvey, Archibald, and Flynn (1995) and 
Malvey and Archbald (1998) indicated that these auctions produced marginally 
greater revenue on the average for the US government.  Nyborg and Sundaresan 
(1996) report that when-issued market volume is higher under uniform- as 
compared to multiple-price auctions, which indicates a higher information release.  
The information release, in turn, reduces the pre-auction uncertainty, the winner’s 
curse, and the probability of short squeeze.  Feldman and Mehra (1993) report that 
uniform-price auctions become readily accepted because of their administrative 
simplicity, economic efficiency, and revenue-enhancing potential.  A plethora of 
academic research papers provide empirical evidence in support of this 
perception.
13   
As summarized in Table 5, Japan’s MOF never adopted uniform-price 
auctions, whereas the U.S. and U.K. employ these auctions for index-linked bonds 
and some bonds with specific maturities (2- and 5-year bonds in the United 
States).
14  The U.S. Treasury has expanded use of uniform-price auctions for all 
Treasury issues from November 1998.   
                                            
13 Refer to Umlauf (1993), Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), and Heller and Lengwiler (1998). 
 
14 Because the uniform-price auction is a legitimate competitive mechanism, the Japanese version of 
a “non-competitive” uniform-price auction is a misnomer.  Non-competitive bids specify quantity only, 
while competitive bids specify both price (or yield) and quantity.  In Japan, the price used for 
settlement for a non-competitive bid is the weighted average price from the competitive auction 
conducted concurrently.  By design, this “non-competitive” method should be restricted to small 
transactions intended for small investors and should remain as an insignificant supplement to multiple-
price auctions.       14 
[Insert Table 5] 
C.  Lack of When-Issued Trading 
Among the developed government securities markets, Japan represents the 
only exception that considers when-issued trading illegal.  In most of the advanced 
markets including the United States, however, trading during the period between the 
time a new issue is announced and the time it is actually issued (ranging from one- 
to two-weeks) is allowed and the issue is said to trade “when, as, and if issued.”
15  
When-issued trading functions like trading in a futures market, in which long and 
short positions are taken prior to the settlement date which is the issue day of the 
security traded.  Prior to auctions, when-issued securities are quoted for trading on a 
yield basis because a coupon is not determined until after an auction is completed.  
Subsequent to auctions, they are quoted on a price basis.  The most important 
benefit of when-issued trading is the minimization of price and quantity uncertainties.  
As trading on a when-issued basis facilitates the price discovery and distribution, the 
risk of underwriting becomes smaller and potential revenue from the new issue 
increases for the government.  By not allowing when-issued trading, the MOF 
foregoes these benefits.    
D. REPO  Market 
A REPO represents the sale of securities by the borrower to the lender 
(investor) with an agreement to repurchase the securities at a specified date and 
price.  It is a combination of spot sale and forward purchase of the securities.  The 
difference between the selling and repurchasing prices represents the interest on 
                                                                                                                                  
 
15 Refer to Appendix A “Background on the Treasury Securities Market” in the Joint Report on the 
Government Securities Market (1992), A1-A19.   15 
the transaction.  The borrower’s REPO is the lender’s reverse REPO.  The REPO 
market serves numerous purposes.  It allows primary dealers to cover their short 
positions, institutional investors to maximize their investment income by lending their 
securities, and foreign investors to reduce currency risk through money market 
hedging.
16   It also facilitates clearing and settlement transactions and enhances 
market liquidity.  Without an active REPO market, the primary and secondary 
markets cannot develop to their full potentials. 
The Kashisai market (now patterned after the U.S.-style REPO market) is 
basically a cash-backed bond lending market with the same effect as that of the 
Gensaki market.  However, Kashisai transactions differ from Gensaki transactions in 
that they are marked-to-market on a daily basis like the U.S.-style REPOs.     
Kashisai transactions steadily increased since the shift to rolling settlement in 
October 1996.
17   The  Kashisai  market witnessed a major impediment eliminated 
when the upper limit on the interest rate charged on the cash collateral was lifted in 
1996.  In addition, market participants in the Gensaki REPO market are exempted 
from payment of securities transaction tax in 1999.  With these positive 
developments, one would expect the Kashisai market and the Gensaki market to 
take off.  No drastic changes in market activities have been reported so far.  This 
puzzle surrounding the Gensaki and the Kashisai markets warrants a careful review.  
 
                                            
16 Brossard (1998) reports that the newly developed REPO market in 1991-1993 was essential to 
foreign participation in the French government securities market.  At present, one-third of the French 
government securities are held by non-residents.   
 
17 Refer to Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks and Monetary Authorities’ 
Financial Markets and Payment Systems in EMEAP Economies (1997).   
    16 
E.  Introduction of STRIPS   
At present, Japan does not allow “coupon stripping” which splits bond income 
streams into coupon interest and principal repayment.  The coupon stripping was 
devised in 1982 by Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers to serve bond investors who 
were concerned about reinvestment risk.  Beginning in 1985, the Treasury 
introduced the Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities 
(STRIPS) program to formalize the stripping of designated Treasury securities.  The 
main appeal of STRIPS is to provide the market with highly liquid zero-coupon 
Treasury bonds and notes, thereby expanding the bond investor base.  The strip 
market also generates arbitrage activities.  Primary dealers continuously check the 
price of strippable bonds against the sum of the stripped parts (the “whole” versus 
the sum of “parts”).  The existence of zero-coupon yield curve allows a better pricing 
of traditional coupon bonds.  In developing a very active government securities 
market from an insignificant and illiquid market, the French authorities, for example, 
introduced a set of well-sequenced reform measures.  As shown below, the 
introduction of STRIPS and the creation of legal and institutional framework for the 
REPO market were the last set of reform measures implemented in France: 
•  Bond futures market (1986) 
•  Primary dealer system (1987) 
•  Interdealer broker network (1987) 
•  Purely competitive auctions (1987) 
•  REPOs (1991) 
•  STRIPS (1991) 
 
Given the U.S. experience with STRIPS and more recent experiences in the French 
government securities market, the MOF should expedite the introduction of STRIPS. 
   17 
IV.  Internationalization of Yen: Implications for the Creation of a Regional 
Bond Markets 
 
  Under the new Miyazawa Initiative, a total of $30 billion was pledged by 
Japan and one-half of this amount was made available for the medium- to long-term 
financing needs for Asian economies affected by the financial crisis.  At least two 
measures under the Initiative are directly related to regional bond market activities.  
They are: (i) acquisition of sovereign bonds issued by Asian countries by the Japan 
Bank for International Cooperation (formerly Export-Import Bank of Japan) and (ii) 
support for Asian countries in raising funds from international financial markets 
through the use of guarantee mechanisms.  These measures are important vehicles 
to promote the global and regional role of the Tokyo market by expanding the Gaisai 
market.  Gaisai  is a general term assigned to all foreign- and yen-denominated 
bonds issued in Japan by non-residents.  Yen-denominated bonds are called 
“samurai” bonds while foreign-currency-denominated bonds are known as “shogun” 
bonds.  The capital-market-related funding programs of the New Miyazawa Initiative 
were expected to provide the Tokyo financial markets (both on- and off-shore) with a 
critical momentum to reaffirm itself as a global and regional financial center.   
Unfortunately, no details have been made available from the MOF regarding the 
implementation of the above two measures, in addition to the fact that the underlying 
reasons for the unavailability are not clear.   As presented in Table 6, the amount of 
Gaisai bonds issued does not exhibit any substantial increases over the 5-year 
period, 1995-1999.   
[Insert Table 6]   18 
  As an international financial center, the Tokyo market must compete with 
other financial markets including the eurobond market.  As shown in Table 7, the 
difference in all-in-cost to sovereign borrower of ¥20 billion between samurai bonds 
and euro-yen bonds amounts to 7 basis points or ¥14 million.  The difference 
between time-lengths required for bond issuance in both markets differs 
substantially (6-7 weeks vs. a few days).   With a recording system still in place, the 
clearing and settlement processes in the samurai bond market is far more 
cumbersome than the eurobond market where Euroclear and Cedel are readily 
available and utilized.  In order for the Tokyo market to serve global and regional 
customers more efficiently at the least cost, concerted efforts must be made.   
[Insert Table 7] 
  Numerous reform measures were undertaken to internationalize the yen and 
promote foreign investments in the Tokyo financial markets.  A legal framework for 
the promotion of cross-border transactions is in place with the revision of Foreign 
Exchange Law in April 1998; yet, much more has to be done to facilitate actual 
transactions.  For example, clearing and settlement have to be revamped to 
introduce delivery versus payment (DVP).  At present, 67.6% of registered JGBs 
and 42.7% of book-entry JGBs are settled on the DVP basis, whereas all JGBs 
processed through the Bank of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-Net) rely on 
the DVP settlement.  In contrast, the U.S. and U.K. government securities are all 
settled on the DVP basis.  Additionally, JGBs are not eligible for clearing through 
international clearing houses such as Euroclear and Cedel, whereas U.S. and UK 
government securities are all eligible.  Furthermore, no regional clearing network   19 
has been created to link the Tokyo clearing system with the region’s financial 
centers such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Sydney.  A T+3 settlement period for 
JGBs is longer than T+1 cycle for U.S. and U.K. securities.  Real-time-gross 
settlement systems (RTGS) must also be completed to bring Japan’s practices in 
line with U.S. and U.K. systems.
18  No publicly accepted practice exists for failures of 
deliveries in Japan unlike the U.S. and U.K. markets.
19     
  So much work has yet to be done for the harmonization of cross-border 
listing, trading, clearing and settlements, securities borrowing and lending, REPO 
markets, etc.  A study of inter- and intra-region portfolio capital flows must precede 
the implementation of the above cross-border infrastructures.  In his own 
assessment of the Japanese debt market serving the Asia-Pacific region’s financing 
needs, Sakakibara (1999) noted that the JGB market still lagged substantially 
behind London and New York in terms of market infrastructure.  Therefore, in 
addition to building domestic market infrastructures, Japan should intensify its effort 
to assume a leadership role in creating regional bond market infrastructures in 
Tokyo and other financial centers in the region.  One of key projects for the regional 
bond market infrastructures should focus on the creation of a single regional central 
securities depository (CSD) to perform the safekeeping, clearance, and settlement 
functions for all securities available in the Asia-Pacific region.
20    
    
                                            
18 The target date of adopting RTGS for JGBs is the latter part of 2000. 
 
19 Refer to Appendix “Table of Questionnaire Results” to Bank for International Settlements, 1999, 
Market Liquidity: Research Findings and Selected Policy Issues (May). 
 
20 For the regional and global level clearing and settlement, refer to Rhee (2000a) and Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company (1993).   20 
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Government Debt and Fiscal Deficit 
 
   * 
 Japan  United States United  Kingdom 
A. Government Debt /GDP(%)       
1997 101.1  65.9  65.8 
1998 117.9  62.1  65.8 
1999 127.8  57.7  62.6 
2000 137.2  53.2  61.0 
 
     
B. Fiscal Deficit /GDP(%)       
1997 -3.4  0.4  -2.1 
1998 -5.3  1.3  0.3 
1999 -7.3  1.6  -0.4 
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Table 4 
Government Securities Markets 
 
      
  Japan United  States United  Kingdom 
Turnover Ratio  6.9  22.0  7.0 
      
Bid-Ask Spread       
10-Year On-the-Run Issues  7.0  3.1  4.0 
10-Year Off-the-Run Issues  7.0  6.3  4.0 
      
Maturity Distribution       
< 1 Year  5%  21%    7% 
1-5 Year  8%  62%  29% 
5-10 Year  78%     0%  34% 
>10 Year  9%  17%  30% 
      
Average Issue Size ($Billion)  8.2  13.9  5.6 
      
Government/Central Bank Holding (%)  46.3  13.1  3.6 
      
Non-Resident Holding (%)  10.0  36.9  14.4 
      
Settlement T+3  T+1  T+1 
      






•  All JGBs through 
BOJ-NET 
100% 100% 
      
No. of Primary Dealers  None  37 16 
      
No. of Dealers  501  1,700 16 
 
Source: Inoue (1999) 
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Auction Methods for  
Government-Issued Securities  
 




None  •  All Treasury 
Securities  







•  20-Year Bond: 
Competitive 
Auction Only 
•  2-, 4- and 6-Year 
Bond: Both 
Competitive and         
Non-competitive 
Auction 
•  5- and 10-Year 
Bond: Syndicated 
Underwriting  





Source: Asia-Pacific Financial Markets Research Center, 
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Table 6 




Unit:  ¥ trillion 
 
   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999* 
 
 
Samurai Bonds  ¥1.6   ¥3.9   ¥2.1   ¥0.3   ¥0.5 
Shogun Bonds**     0        0        0        0        0 
 
  
  Notes:   *  Including the first 10 months only. 
   * *   L a s t   shogun bonds were issued in 1994. 
 
 
  Source:  Industrial Bank of Japan Securities Company 










Issuer:  Sovereign  Borrower 
Issue Amount:  ¥20 billion 
Term:    5  years 
 
 
     Samurai Bonds   Euro-Yen  Bonds 
 
 
Underwriting Fee       40 bp (upfront)    25 bp (upfront) 
Commissioned Bank Fee/ 
  Recording Fee     3 bp  (upfront)    n.a. 
Interest Payment Commission  20 bp        nil 
(of each payment) 
Principal Payment Commission  10 bp (at maturity)    nil 
Out-of-Pocket  Expenses   ¥15  million    ¥8  million 
     (upfront)    (upfront) 
 
All-in-Cost  to  Issuer    2.03%  (s.a.)    1.961%  (s.a.) 
 
Time-Length of Launch    6 to 7 weeks      A few days 
Clearing and Settlement    Recording System    Euroclear and  
        C e d e l  
 
  
  Notes:   a.  bp = basis point 
   b.  s.a.  =  semi-annual  basis 
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